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Abstract 
 
The relationship between the United States and Taiwan is of great importance 
to both parties. Taiwan offers certain strategic opportunities for the promotion of 
American national security interests, and the U.S. accordingly provides Taiwan with 
support of both a defensive and diplomatic nature. The official U.S. policies regarding 
relations with Taiwan are enumerated in the Taiwan Relations Act (United States 
Code Title 22 Chapter 48 Sections 3301 – 3316). The act, approved by the U.S. 
Congress in 1967, stipulates the terms of the bilateral relationship with regard to 
national defense and diplomatic relations among other factors. This paper seeks to 
obtain a more developed picture of sentiments on both sides of this relationship in 
order to understand better the U.S.’s influence and power in Taiwan and in the region.  
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Chapter One: Introduction 
 
Many of the conflicts that take place in the world of international affairs are 
due to a lack of complete information about other states and their intentions. States in 
the international system commonly project their own policies and opinions onto other 
states, and therefore make the mistake of assuming that they understand what these 
other states are thinking. To mitigate the risk of conflict, we must therefore obtain a 
more complete understanding of actors and their intentions. According to classical 
game theory, which attempts to determine how actors will act in any given conflict, 
“when there is uncertainty, expected utilities can be defined and computed only if all 
relevant uncertain events can be assigned probabilities.”1 While actors’ intentions 
themselves are nearly always opaque, they are often driven by desire, and so it is that 
in the case of the U.S. relationship with Taiwan we must seek to understand 
Taiwanese desires, and thus assign the necessary probabilities. What is it that the 
Taiwanese want from their relationship with the U.S.? What are their priorities? Are 
they willing to give in some areas (i.e. participation in international organizations) for 
more influence in others (i.e. defense)?  
This paper seeks to assess Taiwanese perceptions of the U.S.-Taiwan 
relationship through quantitative data analysis in the form of a survey. The survey 
will ultimately rely on the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) as a basis with which to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Myerson, Roger B. Game Theory: Analysis of Conflict, Harvard University Press, 1997, 5. 
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determine which aspects of the U.S.-Taiwan relationship are of the most importance 
to the Taiwanese people. Most of the major aspects of the relationship are included in 
the TRA, and it is the best official measure of the relationship, as it specifically 
enumerates the different interactions that the U.S. may have with Taiwan. It is only 
through a true understanding of what each party expects and desires from the 
relationship that we can hope to improve our diplomatic standing with Taiwan, and 
also with her inseparable neighbor, China. 
China’s relationship with Taiwan presents a potentially large security threat 
for the United States. The mainland holds fast to their “one-China” policy, and 
considers the “Taiwan issue” to be one of their core national interests, from which 
they are unlikely to back down: 
China’s core interests are the issues that Beijing essentially considers 
nonnegotiable and is likely willing to use military force to protect against any 
change to the status quo…The country’s core national interests unquestionably 
include Taiwan.2  
China is currently attempting to assert a policy of neo-nationalism through 
careful diplomacy, which involves the inclusion of Taiwan in all national politics. In 
fact, when provoked regarding her core interests, as happened when the U.S. sold six 
billion dollars worth of arms to Taiwan, China reacted much more forcefully than 
anyone might have predicted. The mainland threatened sanctions on the companies 
that provided the weapons to Taiwan, and expressed a surprising anger toward the 
U.S. Their response may indicate a more forceful foreign policy toward the U.S., 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 19 January 2011, available from 
http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=42332#interests; 
Internet; accessed 22 February 2011. 
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which suggests their desire to assert themselves as a new world power. If the U.S. 
continues to anger the Chinese by supporting Taiwan, it could seriously threaten the 
U.S.-Chinese relationship, which would certainly prove a threat to U.S. national 
security. 
In understanding what the Taiwanese desire from the bilateral relationship, the 
U.S. will be in a better position to exercise diplomatic control. If for example, it is 
determined that the Taiwanese care more about maintaining positive diplomatic 
relations with the U.S. than the continued sale of arms, the U.S. may be able to use 
this knowledge as a bargaining chip and avoid further troubles with China. Because 
the three countries’ foreign, defense and economic policies are so intricately 
intertwined, it is important to be able to view these relations accurately from each 
vantage point. This study aims to accomplish a portion of that overarching goal that 
will contribute to the future of U.S.-Sino relations. 
  4 
Chapter Two: Background on U.S.-Taiwan Relations 
 
The U.S.-Taiwan relationship has had its ups and downs since the official set 
up of the Republic of China (ROC) in 1911. The U.S. maintained its official 
recognition of the ROC (the formal name of Taiwan) until 1979, when the Nixon 
administration decided to acknowledge the People’s Republic of China (PRC) as the 
official government of China. It was at this time that the U.S. Congress passed the 
Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) in order to:  
(1) help maintain peace, security and stability in the Western Pacific; and, (2) 
to promote the foreign policy of the United States by authorizing the 
continuation of commercial, cultural, and other relations between the people 
of the United States and the people on Taiwan.3 
Today, the U.S. claims an “unofficial” relationship with Taiwan, and abides 
by the “one-China” policy, which each side of the Taiwan Strait defines differently. 
While clearly stating support for the “one-China” policy, the U.S. consistently leaves 
their interpretation of it ambiguous. The U.S. has never recognized China’s rule over 
Taiwan, nor do they recognize or officially support independence for the island. As 
stated above in the TRA, the country’s main objective in this tense triangular 
relationship is to “maintain peace, security and stability.” According to Asian affairs 
specialists, Shirley A. Kan and Wayne M. Morrison:  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Taiwan Relations Act of 1979. U.S. Code 22 sec. 3301 (1979). 
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Overall, U.S. policy seeks to support security, political, and economic interests 
that involve peace and stability, the status quo in the Taiwan Strait, Taiwan’s 
efforts to maintain international space, democracy and human rights in 
Taiwan, and U.S. businesses in Taiwan.4 
The U.S. relationship with Taiwan is clearly complicated by its increasing 
dependence on China, which is now our second largest trading partner. China’s 
growing economic, military and political power in the world make it progressively 
more difficult for the U.S. to support Taiwan in any meaningful way. For now, 
however, the U.S. continues to uphold her commitments stated in the TRA, and at 
times uses these commitments to balance the rising power of China. The TRA, 
therefore, remains a highly relevant and controversial document, which will be useful 
in determining Taiwanese opinions on their relationship with the U.S. 
There is one important area within the bilateral relationship that is not 
explicitly covered in the TRA: trade. Bilateral trade is of great significance in any 
state-to-state relationship, and it is no less so in the U.S.-Taiwan relationship. “In 
2011, Taiwan was the tenth-largest U.S. trading partner and the sixth-largest market 
for U.S. agriculture exports.”5 As will be explained in the methodology section, in 
chapter three, the lack of inclusion in the TRA also means that the survey will not 
address the issue of bilateral trade. To further complicate the issue of non-inclusion, 
trade concerns between the U.S. and Taiwan have caused significant controversy in 
recent years, and have been an important component of the relationship. Unable or 
unwilling to sign official Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) with Taiwan, the U.S. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 U.S. Library of Congress, CRS, U.S-Taiwan Relationship: Overview of Policy Issues, by 
Shirley A. Kan and Wayne M. Morrison, CRS Report R41592 (Washington, DC: Office of 
Congressional Information and Publishing, January 4, 2013).   
 
5 Ibid. 
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previously had a Trade and Investment Framework Agreement (TIFA). Taiwan has 
recently made attempts to resume trade talks under TIFA, but the U.S. has cited 
concerns over Taiwanese restrictions on hormone-fed U.S. beef. Indeed, this beef 
issue was one of the most talked-about issues in Taiwan at the time of survey 
distribution. According to Voice of America:  
the decision (to allow U.S. beef imports) – which had grown so controversial 
that it shut down parliament in June – was not made because Taiwanese want 
more steak dinners. The government of the trade-dependent, diplomatically 
isolated island expects key favors in return from its strongest informal ally, 
Washington.6 
The main “favor” that the Taiwanese expected from the U.S. in return for 
allowing beef imports was the resumption of trade talks under TIFA. It is clear that 
continued trade with the U.S. is of great importance to the Taiwanese people. Because 
trade issues will not be included in the survey, we will not know how important trade 
is to the Taiwanese people in comparison with the other issues at hand. We must 
therefore keep the trade issue in mind when discussing policy implications of survey 
results.  
Beyond the TRA, there are several other key documents that guide U.S. policy 
towards Taiwan. They include the three U.S.-PRC Joint Communiqués of 1972, 1979, 
and 1982, and the “Six Assurances” of 1982. President Reagan’s “Six Assurances” 
stated that the United States:  
(1) has not agreed to set a date for ending arms sales to Taiwan; (2) has not 
agreed to hold prior consultations with the PRC on arms sales to Taiwan; (3) 
will not play any mediation role between Taipei and Beijing; (4) has not 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Jennings, Ralph. “Taiwan Expects US Deals After Beef Import Concession,” Voice of 
America, August 2, 2012, News Section, Asia Section.  
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agreed to revise the Taiwan Relations Act; (5) has not altered its position 
regarding sovereignty over Taiwan; and (6) will not exert pressure on Taiwan 
to negotiate with the PRC.7 
These documents, while important to the relationship, are less inclusive than 
the TRA. They symbolize bits and pieces of a whole relationship that is largely 
embodied in the TRA, and will not therefore be used in the survey.  
Finally, it is of value to note the well-developed democratic form of 
government in Taiwan. With a two-party system that becomes more solidified with 
every passing election, highly salient issues such as the relationship with the U.S. and 
the relationship with China have a large impact on foreign policy. In the recent 2012 
Presidential election, for example, the cross-Strait relationship was one of the most 
prominent issues. Many people consider the two major parties, the Kuomintang 
(KMT) and the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), to be split along this very issue. 
Where the DPP has historically been more pro-independent, the KMT has, in recent 
years, been pushing to ease tensions across the Strait. As Ted Galen Carpenter of the 
CATO Institute put it:  
Voters in Taiwan have certainly set the stage for progress. Mr. Ma's 
commitment to promoting stability and cooperation with the mainland is 
calibrated to reduce the cross-Strait tensions that reached alarming levels 
under former President Chen Shui-bian and his pro-independence Democratic 
Progressive Party. The conventional wisdom in both the U.S. and China is that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 U.S. Library of Congress, CRS, U.S-Taiwan Relationship: Overview of Policy Issues, by 
Shirley A. Kan and Wayne M. Morrison, CRS Report R41592 (Washington, DC: Office of 
Congressional Information and Publishing, January 4, 2013).   
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the KMT's electoral triumph was a repudiation of the DPP's assertive, pro-
independence policies.8  
 The cross-Strait relationship and the U.S.-Taiwan relationship are arguably of 
equal importance to most Taiwanese citizens. Voter opinion on these issues serve to 
guide Taiwanese policy, and thereby create changes in the triangular relationship. The 
data collected in this paper will therefore be of use in identifying Taiwanese desires 
and possible future policy directions that will have an effect on the future of the U.S.-
Taiwan relationship.  
U.S. Beliefs Regarding the Bilateral Relationship 
Prior to undertaking the study it is important to note what current U.S. 
policymakers believe regarding the Taiwanese perceptions to be measured, so that we 
may later compare these beliefs to the research findings. Within the U.S. legislature, 
there are currently two bipartisan bodies, the Senate Taiwan Caucus and the 
Congressional Taiwan Caucus, with a combined 165 members, who proclaim their 
support for the island.9 Prior to Chinese President Hu Jin Tao’s January, 2010 visit to 
the U.S., the long dormant Senate Taiwan Caucus drafted a letter to President Obama 
stating their explicit support for Taiwan:  
The PRC has engaged in a large scale military build-up over the past few 
years and has not abandoned the threat of force, with an estimated 1,000 active 
missiles pointed directly at Taiwan,’ the letter stated. ‘For these reasons, it is 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 CATO Institute, 30 October 2008, available from, 
http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=9757&utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium
=feed&utm_campaign=Feed percent3A+CatoRecentOpeds+(Cato+Recent+Op-eds); Internet; 
accessed 22 February 2011.  
 
9 Foreign Policy, 14 January 2011, available from, 
http://thecable.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/01/14/senate_taiwan_caucus_resurfaces_in_tim
e_for_hu_visit; Internet; accessed 19 February 2011. 
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of utmost importance that President Hu understands the United States' 
unwavering commitment to providing Taiwan with the tools necessary for its 
self-defense." They additionally expressed their wishes to President Obama 
that, "As faithful friends of Taiwan in the U.S. Senate, we ask that during 
President Hu's visit, you emphasize that the United States' position on Taiwan 
remains clear: the United States will support Taiwan's security, and continue 
to provide Taiwan with defensive arms.10 
 
It is evident from their statements that the Senate Taiwan Caucus focused 
heavily on the defense-related aspects of the bilateral relationship when faced with the 
visit of a Chinese president.  
Former Secretary of Defense, Robert Gates echoed these defense-centered 
sentiments when asked to comment on the U.S.’s Taiwan policy:  
Again, this is not policy. This is law. We do not support independence for 
Taiwan, but at the same time we have certain obligations under that law (The 
Taiwan Relations Act),’ he said. ‘Under [former US] president [George W.] 
Bush and [US] President [Barack] Obama, we have been certainly cognizant 
of Chinese sensitivities [regarding Taiwan]. And I believe that the decisions 
that have been made have focused on defensive capabilities,’ Gates said.11  
Additionally, despite President Obama’s slightly ambiguous comments on the 
U.S.-Taiwan defense policy during Hu’s visit, he approved a new arms sale package 
to the island following the visit, worth more than $6 billion.12 In a much less 
ambiguous statement made during his first presidential campaign, Wendy Morigi, 
national security spokesperson for Obama stated: 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Ibid. 
 
11 Taipei Times, 13 January, 2011, available from, 
http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2011/01/13/2003493357/1; Internet; 
accessed 19 February 2011.   
 
12 For more information, see: New York Times, 30 January 2010, available from, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/30/world/asia/30arms.html; Internet; accessed 19 February 
2011.  
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Senator Obama welcomes the Bush Administration's decision to notify 
Congress concerning the package of weapons systems for Taiwan. This 
package represents an important response to Taiwan's defense needs. This 
action is fully consistent with U.S. obligations under the Taiwan Relations 
Act. The sale helps to contribute to Taiwan's defense and the maintenance of a 
healthy balance in the Taiwan Strait.13  
 
The opposition Republican candidate, influential Senator John McCain, 
interestingly believed that the administration had not gone far enough in their support 
for Taiwan: "The package will not include submarines or new F-16 aircraft. I urge the 
administration to reconsider this decision, in light of its previous commitment to 
provide submarines and America's previous sales of F-16s,’ McCain said.”14  
It is apparent from the above comments that what top policy makers are most 
concerned with is the defensive capabilities of Taiwan. They believe that the 
continued supply of such defense capabilities and services is essential to maintaining 
positive relations with the island, and to maintaining peace across the Taiwan Strait. 
Defense is apparently the highest-profile issue when it comes to Taiwan.  
 While it is difficult to find any record of top U.S. policymakers discussing 
Taiwan on issues other than defense, there are several instances of influential 
members of both government and the press speaking out on Taiwan’s behalf. On 
March 12, 2013, for example, Representative Pete Sessions of Texas wrote to the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 Kessler, Glen. “Obama commends Taiwan Arms Sale,” Washington Post, October 8 2008, 
available from, http://voices.washingtonpost.com/44/2008/10/obama-commends-taiwan-
arms-sal.html; Internet; accessed 19 February 2011.   
 
14 Kessler, Glen “Obama commends Taiwan Arms Sale.” 
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Speaker of the House to state his support for the resumption of trade talks with 
Taiwan under TIFA. He stated:  
Increased economic relations between the United States and Taiwan will 
provide significant economic advantages to both countries. I am proud to 
express my strong support for strengthening the bilateral relationship between 
the United States and Taiwan. Taiwan is an important ally and trading partner, 
and we must continue to further our relationship.15 
 
 As discussed above, these trade talks have been minimalized in recent years 
due to concerns over the import of beef. Since Taiwan has recently conceded, and 
agreed to allow the import of U.S. beef, Rep. Sessions’s March 2013 statement was 
well-timed. If TIFA talks resume as expected, however, it is unlikely that the issue of 
trade will continue to cause this type of high-level chatter. Rather, it is much more 
likely that Taiwan will merely become a normalized trading partner.  
There is additionally some talk regarding Taiwan’s participation in 
international organizations. Academics tend to debate whether Taiwan can qualify for 
participation in such organizations, due to a lack of official statehood. As Richard 
Bush of the Brookings Institution puts it, however, “Taiwan can contribute to the 
solution of regional and global problems.”16 Bush’s simply stated claim implies that 
by excluding Taiwan from the dialogue and work done in these international 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 Capitol Words, “Support of TIFA with Taiwan,” Capitol Words, 
http://capitolwords.org/date/2013/03/12/E274-2_support-of-tifa-with-taiwan/ (accessed April 
8, 2013). 
 
16 Bush, Richard R. “International Organizations and Taiwan.” Brookings Institution, 
http://www.brookings.edu/events/2011/03/14-taiwan.  
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organizations, the world is missing out on key contributions from a willing and able 
actor: 
An international problem emerges that requires full global participation to 
solve. By any reasonable criteria, Taiwan, which is among the world's 25 
largest economies and a demonstrably good international citizen, should be a 
participant. Yet Taiwan's participation is blocked by the mainland Chinese 
government, which exercises an effective veto power by threatening other 
governments with economic or political retaliation for any perceived 
"recognition" of Taiwan.17 
 Academics and journalists are clearly paying attention to important issues like 
Taiwan’s participation in international organizations. Additionally, in 2011 the U.S. 
Senate passed Concurrent Resolution 17, a resolution expressing the sense of 
Congress that Taiwan should be accorded observer status in the International Civil 
Aviation Organization (ICAO). While a small step for a country with big ambitions, 
this resolution was nonetheless significant. It is a first step towards participation in 
larger, more significant international organizations.  
 Despite limited support for participation in international organizations and the 
resumption of trade talks under TIFA, defense is still clearly the most salient issue in 
U.S. policy circles when it comes to Taiwan. It is therefore the aim of this paper to 
determine whether the importance U.S. policymakers currently place on the continued 
defense of Taiwan is in fact reflected by what the Taiwanese people truly value. This 
knowledge may be of use to these same U.S. policymakers in determining diplomatic 
strategy across the Taiwan Strait.   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 Roy, Dennis. “Let Taiwan in (to International Organizations),” New York Times, October 
28, 2011, Opinion Section, Asia Section.  
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This in-depth assessment of state-to-state relations will help to alleviate the 
projection-bias common in U.S. foreign policy. We cannot assume that we understand 
what is important to the Taiwanese people until we ask candidly. Armed with this 
deeper understanding of Taiwanese perceptions, the U.S. will have a stronger 
grounding on which to base diplomatic relations with both Taiwan and China, and to 
leverage that knowledge appropriately. 
  
  14 
Chapter Three: Methodology 
 
In order to gauge current Taiwanese opinions on the bilateral relationship with 
the U.S., a survey of the Taiwanese people was conducted utilizing the Taiwan 
Relations Act (TRA) as an official source for the different aspects of the relationship. 
In the TRA, the U.S. stipulates the specific goods and services that it is willing to 
provide to Taiwan, and each section of the Act that is relevant to the needs of the 
Taiwanese people is easily separated in to one of six categories: defense relations, 
laws & international agreements, the American Institute in Taiwan (AIT), treaties, 
and participation in international organizations. There are several other sections in the 
TRA that concern either the employment of U.S. citizens or specific activities of U.S. 
government agencies, including, for example, section 3307, which exempts 
employees of U.S. government agencies operating in Taiwan from taxation. These 
sections are not related to the needs or desires of Taiwanese citizens, and as such have 
been excluded from the survey. 
As previously discussed, the issue of bilateral trade was also excluded from 
the survey. This is due purely to its exclusion from the TRA. All survey questions 
were adapted from sections of the TRA, and trade’s non-inclusion in the document 
necessitates its exclusion from the survey as well.  
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The survey was distributed to the Taiwanese people in an attempt to gather 
information based on personal beliefs of the relative importance of the six previously 
defined categories of the relationship. It is important to note that the average 
Taiwanese citizen has a high level of awareness of the TRA and its implications in the 
U.S.-Taiwan relationship. In addition, in order to ensure that all respondents are fully 
aware of the document and are therefore able to answer the questions appropriately, a 
copy of the TRA, in Chinese, was distributed along with the survey.  
Responses to the survey take the form of a Likert Scale. All questions required 
the respondent to determine how important, according to personal beliefs, a specific 
section of the TRA is to the U.S.-Taiwan relationship. The survey consists of six 
questions – one to represent each of the categories (defense relations, laws & 
international agreements, AIT, treaties, and participation in international 
organizations). Each question was written to echo the applicable section of the TRA. 
For example, section 3302 (a) of the TRA discusses policy regarding “defense articles 
and defense services”. It states: 
In furtherance of the policy set forth in section 3301 of this title, the United 
States will make available to Taiwan such defense articles and defense 
services in such quantity as may be necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a 
sufficient self-defense capability.18 
The survey question related to section 3302 (a) therefore reflects the most 
basic characteristics of the law, but ultimately uses simpler language. The modified 
language used was necessary in order to quickly and successfully communicate the 
purpose of the question to those taking the survey. In order to obtain significant and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 Taiwan Relations Act of 1979. U.S. Code 22 sec. 3302 (1979). 
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comprehensible responses, questions were posed to determine how strongly the 
respondent agrees with a given statement. The “defense relations” question therefore 
reads:  
“I believe that it is important for the United States to keep its promise to 
supply Taiwan with defense articles and defense services.”  
1. Strongly Disagree 
2. Disagree 
3. Neither Agree nor Disagree 
4. Agree 
5. Strongly Agree 
By beginning the question with the statement “I believe” and providing the 
possible answers listed above, it was determined how strongly that specific portion of 
the TRA affected the respondent.  
After collected, results were tabulated for each question to determine the 
number of 1s (strongly disagree), 2s (disagree), etc. per question across all of the 
surveys. All results were then added up and averaged to acquire a final figure for each 
question. If a participant failed to answer every question, their survey was discarded 
in order to maintain comparable data across questions.  
A low final score indicates a lack of importance to the Taiwanese for the 
aspect of the relationship in question. Conversely, a high score indicates a high degree 
of importance to the Taiwanese for the part of the relationship in question. When the 
scores were tallied and averaged, the questions (aspects of the relationship) were then 
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placed in numerical order, to determine which aspect of the bilateral relationship 
listed in the TRA is of the most importance to the Taiwanese people. In Chapter Four 
of this paper, each individual question will be analyzed in further detail.  
In order to acquire statistically significant data in a survey, an adequate 
number of people need to be polled. To determine this number, a standard error 
calculation was completed based on the total population of Taiwan (23,024,95619), the 
generally accepted standard error in the social sciences (5 percent), and a relatively 
low confidence interval (4 percent). According to these calculations, 600 citizens 
constitute statistical representation for Taiwan. In order to ensure that distinct 
demographic subcategories were populated, people from three diverse parts of the 
country were polled. These regions (Taipei, Taichung County, and Taliao, a small 
town outside of Kaohsiung) are geographically spread out and demographically 
diverse. With the use of these different areas, the study accounts for an unacceptable 
bias that would otherwise be obtained if only residents of Taipei were polled. This 
also naturally adds to the variance in income levels and education levels, as urban and 
rural areas of Taiwan tend to contrast to a great degree in these respects. Within each 
of these areas, 2,000 surveys were distributed by mail in a random fashion based on 
lists assembled from publicly available tax records in order to account for the bias of 
the surveyor. With each copy of the survey, a pre-paid return envelope was included. 
No demographic information was collected from respondents. The survey is intended 
to give the people, who are responsible stakeholders in the decision making process in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 CIA Factbook, 9, November 2010, available from 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/tw.html; Internet; accessed 
14, November 2010. 
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Taiwan, a say in the matter. It is likely that including demographic information in the 
survey would have lowered the response rate due to the controversy inherent in 
certain questions.  
Once those surveys that were incomplete were discarded, a total of 635 
responses were recorded, which leaves us with close to a 10.6 percent response rate. 
All surveys were distributed in traditional Mandarin Chinese, which this author 
personally translated and then had a native Chinese speaker confirm. The translations 
are included in Chapter Four. 
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Chapter Four: Survey Results 
 
 The survey, along with a copy of the TRA was distributed in November 2012 
to over 2,000 Taiwanese citizens in the three areas outlined above in Chapter Three. 
The timing of distribution proved significant, as concurrent policy discussions almost 
certainly had an effect on survey responses. These effects will be discussed more in 
depth in the analysis of responses below.  
 The following table shows both the mean and standard deviation of the results 
for each of the six questions in the survey. From these basic results, we see that 
“participation in international organizations” received the highest overall score, and 
that “defense relations” received the lowest overall score. Without any further 
analysis, we would assume that the Taiwanese people care comparatively little about 
defense relations. Defense relations, however, has a significantly higher standard 
deviation (1.4) than any of the other categories, suggesting that the responses for this 
question were quite varied. This deviation will be explored further in the analysis of 
individual questions below.
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 Mean Standard 
Deviation Category 
1. Defense Relations 3.2468 1.4017 
2. Legal Relations 3.6683 0.08926 
3. Immigration Rights 4.0689 0.73879 
4. Treaties 3.6891 0.90804 
5. The American Institute in 
Taiwan 
4.0673 1.1852 
6. International Organizations 4.3045 1.1133 
  Figure 1 
 
 The categories (questions) are listed in rank order, by mean, below. This list 
is, ostensibly, indicative of the order of importance to the Taiwanese people.  
1. Participation in International Organizations 
2. Immigration Rights 
3. The American Institute in Taiwan 
4. Treaties 
5. Legal Relations 
6. Defense Relations 
Figure 2 
 
I will now examine each of the categories and their results individually in 
order to determine whether the above ranking is of real significance. Each question 
will be stated along with its translation, a short background will be given on the issue, 
and then the results will be discussed and analyzed. Following these individual 
analyses, a combined analysis will be completed across categories.  
Survey	  Questions	  by	  Mean	  &	  Standard	  Deviation	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Question One: Defense Relations 
 
“I believe that it is important for the United States to keep its promise to supply 
Taiwan with defense articles and defense services.” 
“我認為，美國應信守承諾，繼續向臺灣提供防衛物資與技術服務。" 
The issue of defense has always been contentious in the U.S.-Taiwan 
relationship. The U.S. promises to, when they deem it appropriate, provide Taiwan 
with arms and services of a defensive nature. China, however, has increasingly taken 
issue with U.S. arms sales to Taiwan. Of all of the portions of the TRA, it is the 
defense issue that garners the most attention, both in the U.S. and internationally. This 
is perhaps because the U.S. continues to sell Taiwan arms, despite progressively more 
forceful backlash from the mainland. On other issues, such as Taiwan’s participation 
in international organizations, the U.S. takes much more of a backseat role, passively 
supporting Taiwan, and doing little to actually increase her standing in these 
important international organizations20. Aid in defense, especially when it comes to 
arms sales, is also a more visible form of support than mere discourse. The issue of 
arms sales to Taiwan comes up every couple of years, and always puts stress on the 
three actors in the triangular relationship. Most recently, in May of 2012, the 
Economist commented on the complicated issue:  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 As stated earlier, the Senate recently passed a resolution supporting observer status for 
Taiwan in the International Civil Aviation Organization. This could be the first step towards 
more support in important international organizations. 
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America has unexpectedly raised the possibility that it might sell Taiwan the 
F-16 C/D fighter jets that it has been requesting since 2006. The move would 
infuriate China. Officials in Beijing have in the past voiced strenuous 
opposition to the sale of F-16 C/Ds, marking it as a line in the sand, of the 
kind that can't be crossed.21 
Because this is one Taiwan’s main foreign policy issues, and because it is so 
highly controversial, it is unlikely that there are many people on the island who are 
neutral on the issue. As we can see in the graph below, only 12 percent of respondents 
“neither agree nor disagree.”  
 
Figure 3 
When we compare Figure 3 to Figures 2 – 6, we see that “defense” is a much 
more contentious issue than the rest, with lots of “agree” (A), “strongly agree” (SA), 
“disagree” (D), and “strongly disagree” (SD) responses, but a comparatively small 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 J.R. “Fighter-Fleet Response,” The Economist, May 1, 2012. 
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number of “neither agree nor disagree” (N) responses. This corresponds to our earlier 
analysis of the high standard deviation in the defense category. It is clear from the 
listed response percentages that the Taiwanese have definite opinions when it comes 
to the continued supply of defensive arms and services. Such a high degree of 
subjectivity will possibly make it harder for outsiders to influence Taiwanese opinion 
on the issue. 
While there may be a lack of neutrality on the defense question, there are still 
many more citizens who are clearly in favor of continued defense aid (53 percent - A 
& SA combined) than against it (35 percent  - D & SD combined), a difference of 18 
percent. With over half (53 percent) of the population in favor of continued defense 
aid, it seems that the Taiwanese still place a high value on it. It would likely prove 
very difficult for the U.S. to discontinue this aid and maintain the general positive 
status of the current relationship with Taiwan. 
Furthermore, it is possible that those respondents that answered N, D or SD 
did so for reasons other than true disagreement or neutrality. Those who disagreed 
that the U.S. should continue the sale of arms may have done so not because of 
allegiance to China or because they believe Taiwan does not need weapons, but 
because they feel that the issue is simply too controversial to “agree” with. This is 
especially true of those who chose either D or N, which together compromise a 
significant 35 percent of responses. The takeaway from this question is therefore that 
the issue of defense remains highly controversial and that most Taiwanese have a 
definite opinion on it.  
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Despite the obvious controversy surrounding the defense issue, it is still a 
hugely important factor in the U.S.-Taiwan relationship, perhaps one of the most 
important. While we may not be able to have a large influence on what Taiwanese 
people think regarding the supply of defensive arms and services, we can surely use 
the fact that they care so much to our advantage. When U.S. policymakers decide to 
either sell or hold back the sale of arms to Taiwan, they are appeasing anywhere from 
1/3 to 1/2 of the population. Furthermore, the sale of weapons has historically been 
the U.S.’s main bargaining chip in the U.S.-China-Taiwan relationship. While the 
U.S. may want to rely on these weapons sales less in the future, it would be unwise to 
discount them entirely simply because of the last-place ranking for “defense relations” 
in Figure 2. Policymakers may want to note the considerable controversy on this issue 
among Taiwanese voters, and seek to utilize it when drafting policies concerning 
Taiwan.  
Question Two: Application of Laws Generally 
 
 “I believe it is important that the laws of the United States apply to Taiwan in the 
same manner that they applied prior to the creation of the Taiwan Relations Act in 
1979.” 
“我認為，美國法律應繼續適用於臺灣，正如 1979年臺灣關係法制訂前之情況
一般。” 
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The TRA is very specific when it comes to the application of laws to Taiwan. 
It states:  
The absence of diplomatic relations or recognition shall not affect the 
application of the laws of the United States with respect to Taiwan, and the 
laws of the United States shall apply with respect to Taiwan in the manner that 
the laws of the United States applied with respect to Taiwan prior to January 
1, 1979.22 
The survey question dealing with legal relations was modified somewhat to 
reflect only the more important aspects of the TRA section above. This simplified 
language allows respondents to better understand the purpose of the question. This 
specific portion of the TRA, section 3302(a), serves to guide most of the other 
sections in the Act. It is the overarching “general” application of laws, from which the 
Act then goes into specifics. The majority of questions in this survey are based on 
subsections of section 3302(a). Only the defense relations and AIT categories stand 
on their own. The “application of laws generally” is therefore a very important 
portion of the TRA. It allows for any law not specifically enumerated in the TRA to 
be treated in an internationally standard manner.  
The statement requiring standard international legal treatment is actually quite 
remarkable. As Richard Bush of the Brookings Institute put it, “if the TRA had not 
issued an explicit mandate, bureaucrats in a variety of agencies might have 
inadvertently cancelled Taiwan’s participation in those programs. The result would 
have been confusion or worse.”23 Taiwan could easily have been sidelined in many 
different legal contexts, but the writers of the TRA prevented this. This is one of the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 Taiwan Relations Act of 1979. U.S. Code 22 sec. 3302 (1979). 
 
23 Bush, Richard C. III. “Thoughts on the Taiwan Relations Act.” Brookings Institution, 
http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2009/04/taiwan-bush.  
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more important aspects of the TRA in terms of the bilateral relationship, and yet it 
receives very little attention. In fact, as stated earlier, the only aspect of the TRA that 
generally receives any attention is defense relations, via arms sales. It is perhaps 
because of this lack of awareness that so many survey respondents were neutral on the 
subject. This neutrality is demonstrated in Figure 4, below.  
 
Figure 4 
 
Legal relations between the U.S. and Taiwan have perhaps the least 
controversy among all of the categories in the survey. Indeed, 35 percent of 
respondents in the survey remain neutral on the subject, and a mere 8 percent (1 
percent SD and 7 percent D) disagree with the above statement. Such a large 
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percentage of neutrality on the legal issue may be indicative of a lack of 
understanding. It is quite possible that the Taiwanese are unaware of which U.S. laws 
that apply to Taiwan exited prior to 1979, and whether these laws still apply. Such a 
misunderstood concept may have led respondents to choose the only answer which 
allowed them to demonstrate their lack of knowledge on the subject, neither agree nor 
disagree.  
On the other hand, the extremely low response rates for the D and SD 
categories indicate that there is at least some degree of understanding and awareness 
of the issue. Legal relations has one of the lowest percentages of disagreement among 
the six categories in the survey. The only lower level of disagreement is found in the 
immigration rights category (3 percent), which will be presented next. This lack of 
disagreement, combined with the 57 percent of respondents who either agreed or 
strongly agreed, suggests that respondents may have had a good degree of 
understanding of the legal issues at hand. 
However, the generally low level of disagreement across categories leads us to 
believe that respondents are simply more likely to agree with any given statement 
than to disagree with it. Defense relations, as discussed in the previous section, is the 
only category with any significant portion of D and SD responses. In fact, the AIT 
question received the next highest percent of disagreement (combined D and SD), 
with a mere 11 percent of the vote. Whether this low level of disagreement indicates a 
lack of awareness, or a decidedly resolved population it is difficult to tell. This author 
is inclined to believe several things: (1) The Taiwanese have a tendency to agree with 
statements rather than disagree, (2) the population is largely unaware of legal issues 
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with the U.S., and (3) where respondents did not fully understand this question, they 
were still inclined to agree due to a general predisposition towards continuity and 
standard treatment.  
Question Three: Immigration Rights 
 
“I believe it is important that, despite the lack of formal diplomatic relations, 
Taiwanese citizens have the standard international rights to immigration and 
citizenship in the United States.” 
“我認為，儘管缺乏正式外交關係，臺灣公民與其他國家公民同樣享有移居美國
並取得該國公民資格之正當權利。” 
 
With regards to immigration policies, the TRA states, “For purposes of the 
Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101 et seq.), Taiwan may be treated in 
the manner specified in the first sentence of section 202(b) of that Act (8 U.S.C. 
1152(b)).”24 Section 202(b) of the Immigration and Nationality Act states:  
Each independent country, self-governing dominion, mandated territory, and 
territory under the international trusteeship system of the United Nations, 
other than the United States and its outlying possessions, shall be treated as a 
separate foreign state for the purposes of a numerical level established under 
subsection (a)(2) when approved by the Secretary of State.25 
The assumption, therefore, is that Taiwan is to be treated as an independent 
state for the purposes of immigration to the United States. The immigration portion of 
the TRA is therefore highly significant, in that it sets up mechanisms to avoid 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 Taiwan Relations Act of 1979, U.S. Code 22, sec. 3303 (1979). 
 
25 Immigration and Nationality Act, U.S. Code. Vol. 8, Sec 202 (1965). 
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controversy over the “one-China” policy entirely. Taiwan is simply treated in the 
same manner as every other state in the international system despite the complicated 
relationship with the mainland.  
In order for the survey question on immigration rights to be easily understood, 
the phrasing needed to be re-worded significantly. It could not be assumed that 
Taiwanese citizens would be familiar with section 202(b) of the U.S.’s Immigration 
and Nationality Act. The question was therefore written, once again, to reflect the 
basic character of the relevant section of the TRA, stating simply that the Taiwanese 
should be treated as all other nations are treated.  
This standard international treatment seems to have resonated with the 
Taiwanese people in a significant way. As can be seen in the chart below, an 
astonishing 64 percent of respondents “agree” with the third survey question, and 
another 24 percent “strongly agree”. Together, 88 percent of all respondents are in 
favor of standard international immigration rights. That leaves 9 percent who are 
neutral on the issue, and a mere 3 percent (2 percent D & 1 percent SD) who reacted 
negatively.  
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Figure 5 
 
The response was overwhelmingly positive – more positive, in fact, than any 
of the other categories. Why might this be so? Is it because of the standard treatment 
itself? Or is it due to a general Taiwanese desire to immigrate to the United States? 
According to immigration statistics, “the United States is home to about 342,000 
Taiwanese immigrants, making them the 24th-largest immigrant group in the United 
States, similar in size to the Japanese and Iranian immigrant populations.”26 This is 
hardly indicative of a group that is desperate to immigrate to the U.S. How then, can 
we account for this hugely positive response? In the case of immigration rights, more 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26  Migration Information Source. “Taiwanese Immigrants in the United States,” Migration 
Information Source, http://www.migrationinformation.org/usfocus/display.cfm?ID=790, 
(accessed April 9, 2013).  
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than any other category, we must look to the political debate at the time of survey 
distribution for our answer.  
In November 2012, when the survey was first distributed, the Taiwanese 
media was covering only a few international issues on a regular basis: controversy in 
the East and South China Seas, the U.S. “pivot” to Asia, rising Chinese tourism in 
Taiwan, and the U.S. Visa Waiver Program. According to the American Institute in 
Taiwan’s website, “the Visa Waiver Program (VWP) enables eligible travelers from 
37 participating countries to travel to the United States for business or tourism…for 
90 days or less without obtaining a visa.”27  
Taiwan’s inclusion in the VWP was announced by then Secretary of State 
Hillary Clinton on October 2, 2012 and went into effect of November 1st of that same 
year. When the Taipei Times announced Taiwan’s inclusion in the VWP, the article’s 
subtitle was bolded in red-colored text and read: “AT LAST”.28 The not-so-subtle text 
of the same article stated, “Washington’s approval comes after a lengthy screening 
process. Taiwan obtained VWP candidacy status in December last year (2011) after 
years of trying to join the program.”29 It is evident that the Taiwanese were not only 
excited by the prospect of entering the VWP, but were proud of becoming only the 
fifth Asian country to participate in it. Immigration to the U.S. was therefore a very 
hot topic in Taiwanese circles in November 2012, when the surveys were distributed. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 American Institute in Taiwan. “Visa Waiver Program,” American Institute in Taiwan, 
http://www.ait.org.tw/en/vwp.html, (accessed April 8, 2013). 
 
28 Shan, Shelly and Shih Hsiu-chuan. “US grants Taiwan visa-waiver status,” Taipei Times, 
October 3, 2012, Front Page.  
 
29 Ibid. 
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If respondents were reading or watching the news at the time, they were very aware of 
the issue, and may have been influenced by the issue’s prominence in the media when 
answering this question on the survey.  
In addition, the very fact that the U.S. had already approved Taiwan’s 
participation in the VWP by the time of survey distribution made the issue much less 
controversial than some others on the table. This lack of controversy may have made 
it easier for respondents to answer A or SA. The only remaining question, therefore, is 
why a significantly higher portion of respondents chose “agree” (64 percent) than 
“strongly agree” (24 percent). We could attribute this to the fact that respondents are 
less likely, in general, to “strongly” agree or disagree with any given question than 
merely agree or disagree. Data from questions five and six on the American Institute 
in Taiwan and participation in international organizations, however, suggest that this 
is not the case (see Figure 7 and Figure 8). Both received more SA votes than A votes. 
While we cannot be sure, this somewhat weaker sense of agreement may be due to the 
fact that the immigration issue had largely been resolved. By the time of the survey, 
there was no longer any real need for advocacy on the issue of immigration rights. 
Respondents were still largely in favor of these rights, and probably wanted to agree 
with the general principle and show some support for a policy that had been 
successfully passed. Whatever the case, immigration rights has the highest overall 
percentage of respondents who answered positively (A and SA) at 88 percent, which 
is a highly significant percentage of overall votes. It is clear that the right to standard 
international immigration is important to the average Taiwanese citizen.   
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Question Four: Treaties 
 
“I believe it is important that the United States continue to honor treaties and other 
international agreements signed by Taiwan, including those signed prior to the 
creation of the Taiwan Relations Act in 1979.” 
“我認為，美國應繼續執行與臺灣所締結之條約與其他國際協定 （包括於 1979
年臺灣關係法制訂前的條約與其他國際協定）。” 
The TRA states:  
For all purposes, including actions in any court in the United States, the 
Congress approves the continuation in force of all treaties and other 
international agreements, including multilateral conventions, entered into by 
the United States and the governing authorities on Taiwan recognized by the 
United States as the Republic of China prior to January 1, 1979, and in force 
between them on December 31, 1978, unless and until terminated in 
accordance with law.30 
The section of the TRA dealing with treaties is very similar to the overarching 
general legal section discussed above. The TRA authors, however, found it necessary 
to specifically mention the continuing approval and enforcement of all treaties and 
other international agreements signed by the U.S. and Taiwan. These international 
agreements are clearly an important part of the bilateral relationship, and therefore 
must be taken into consideration when assessing that relationship.  
The one major treaty that the two countries previously shared was a mutual 
defense treaty. “In the aftermath of the Korean War, given the continued strategic 
importance of the Taiwan Strait during the Cold War era, the ROC and the United 
States signed the Sino-American Mutual Defense Treaty in 1954 to consolidate their 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 Taiwan Relations Act of 1979. U.S. Code 22 sec. 3303 (1979). 
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military alliance.”31 This treaty did not survive the switching of alliances from the 
ROC to the PRC in 1979. U.S. policymakers, however, were still concerned with the 
earlier quoted strategic importance of the Taiwan Strait. In fact, the repeal of the 
Sino-American Mutual Defense Treaty in 1979 was one of the major reasons that 
lawmakers decided to create the TRA, which now serves as a quasi-defense treaty 
between Taiwan and the U.S.  
In the figure below, we can see that over half (52 percent) of respondents 
“agree” with the idea that the U.S. should continue to honor treaties and other 
international agreements made with Taiwan. This statement, requiring that the U.S. 
honor its agreements, unlike some of the previous questions, is not very controversial. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office in the U.S. “Taiwan-U.S. Relations,” 
Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office in the U.S., 
http://www.taiwanembassy.org/US/ct.asp?xItem=266456&CtNode=2297&mp=12&xp1=12, 
(accessed April 6, 2013).  
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Figure 6 
  
 This lack of controversy is easy to see in the absence of D and SD responses, 
which together comprise only 8 percent of the total responses. This could, as is 
possible in the case of legal relations, be due to a lack of understanding of the issue at 
hand. It is more likely, however, that respondents simply found the issue agreeable.  
 It is easy to imagine a Taiwanese citizen who has no idea of what treaties or 
other agreements with the U.S. exist now, or existed prior to 1979. It is also easy to 
imagine a scenario in which that same citizen believes that all international 
agreements entered into with the U.S. should be upheld regardless of the situation 
across the Taiwan Strait. Taiwan depends on the U.S. for her security – both physical 
and commercial – and if the U.S. were to start breaking promises or agreements, 
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Taiwan would surely be worse off for it. Whether or not the average citizen is aware 
of specific treaties and international agreements with Taiwan, he or she is likely to 
want the U.S. to uphold promises made in these treaties and agreements. It is a 
somewhat neutral statement that is relatively easy to agree with regardless of prior 
knowledge. 
 The 25 percent of respondents who answered this question neutrally are most 
probably those citizens who determined that they did not have enough information on 
the subject to make an informed decision. However, with 77 percent of respondents in 
agreement (52 percent A and 25 percent SA) and only 8 percent disagreeing (5 
percent D and 3 percent SD), it is hard to argue anything other than the Taiwanese 
desire for the U.S. to continue honoring bilateral treaties. 
 
Question Five: The American Institute in Taiwan 
 
“I believe it is important that the U.S., through the American Institute in Taiwan 
(AIT), continue to support commercial, cultural and other relations between the 
people of the United States and the people on Taiwan.” 
“我認為，美國應透過美國在臺協會繼續進行實施的各項商業方案、文化交往或
其他關係。” 
 The TRA, in seeking to create a means for diplomatic and everyday 
interaction between the United States and Taiwan, sets up the American Institute in 
Taiwan: 
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Programs, transactions, and other relations conducted or carried out by the 
President or any agency of the United States Government with respect to 
Taiwan shall, in the manner and to the extent directed by the President, be 
conducted and carried out by or through (1) The American Institute in Taiwan, 
a nonprofit corporation incorporated under the laws of the District of 
Columbia, or (2) such comparable successor nongovernmental entity as the 
President may designate, (hereafter in this chapter referred to as the 
''Institute'').32 
The question relating to the AIT section of the TRA takes more from the spirit 
and practice of AIT today than it does from the legal stipulations in the TRA. The 
TRA has allowed AIT to become what it is, and it is the present-day AIT that the 
Taiwanese people know and interact with. AIT operates in a manner nearly identical 
to any official embassy around the world, offering services such as: issuing visas, 
assisting with bilateral agriculture and commercial issues, and assisting U.S. citizens 
in Taiwan. Some believe this section of the TRA to be the most important. It is 
certainly remarkable that Taiwan and the U.S. have maintained what amounts to 
normal diplomatic relations despite the severance of such official relations in 1979. In 
fact, Richard Bush claims:  
The most successful, unremarked element of the TRA is the authorization of 
the American Institute in Taiwan. Once the United States terminated 
diplomatic ties, the mechanisms created for sustaining substantive relations 
became vitally important in ensuring that the two countries could promote 
shared interests. Contact among senior officials and a common strategic 
outlook are needed, of course, but day-to-day diplomacy is vital.33 
Bush’s statement demonstrates the great importance of AIT as a functional 
entity in the U.S.-Taiwan relationship. Without the assurances included in the TRA of 
continuing cultural and commercial relations between the two countries, such 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 Taiwan Relations Act of 1979. U.S. Code 22 sec. 3305 (1979). 
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relations might have fallen to the wayside. The document provides legitimacy to these 
types of bilateral interactions, which the mainland would have surely opposed had 
they not been included in the TRA:  
In 1979, there was no guarantee that AIT and Taiwan’s counterpart 
organization (first the Coordination Council for North American Affairs, later 
renamed the Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office) would 
operate smoothly and effectively. Today, thirty years later, there is no question 
that the two institutions met the 1979 challenge and will continue to do so in 
the future.34 
In meeting and exceeding the challenges that were inherent in the termination 
of official ties, the U.S.-Taiwan relationship has proven its ability to endure. The set 
up of AIT was one important component of this longevity. Whether or not the 
remarkable nature of this portion of the TRA is recognized by the international 
community, it seems that the Taiwanese people, at least, agree that it is vastly 
important. In Figure 7 below, we see that 55 percent of respondents strongly agree 
with the AIT question.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34 Ibid. 
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Figure 7 
 Respondents who strongly agree with the need for continuing bilateral 
relations via AIT comprise over half of all responses. The only category with more 
SA responses in the survey is participation in international organizations, which will 
be discussed next. AIT ranked third in the initial grading of overall averages in Figure 
2, but as we will see in Chapter Five, there may be other ways to view the rankings.  
 Interestingly, the AIT question garnered the second most combined D and SD 
responses. With only 11 percent of the vote, however, this disagreement is not likely 
significant enough to lessen the importance of the 55 percent SA vote. Taiwanese 
citizens are generally aware of AIT and a large portion of these citizens have 
interacted with the agency in some manner in their lifetime. According to the 
Migration Policy Institute, “Taiwan was the fifth most common country of origin for 
international students studying at US institutions of higher learning in 2010…(and) 
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there were just over 8,800 admissions in 2010 involving temporary workers from 
Taiwan with H-1B visas.”35 All of these immigrants to the U.S. would have interacted 
with AIT to obtain visas and other necessary documents. In fact, prior to 2012, when 
Taiwan was admitted to the Visa Waiver Program (VWP), any Taiwanese citizen 
coming to the U.S., even for tourism purposes, would have needed to go to AIT to 
obtain a visa. It is therefore likely that most Taiwanese citizens have a high degree of 
awareness of AIT, and at least some of its functions.  
 Interestingly, 21 percent of respondents remain neutral on the AIT issue. 
While this neutrality may seem to suggest the possibility that the Taiwanese are 
neutral on continued diplomatic ties with the U.S. through AIT, the reality is that 
continued relations with the U.S. are of utmost importance to nearly every Taiwanese 
citizen. According to the Taipei Times:  
as Taiwan continues to carefully navigate its relationship with China, no 
friendly country is more crucial to Taiwan than the US and no relationship in 
the region is a more important bellwether of Washington’s commitment to its 
friends, allies and ideals than its relationship with Taiwan.36 
The simple fact is that the U.S. is one of Taiwan’s two most important 
partners in the world. Every Taiwanese citizen is aware of this, and it is unlikely that 
they would be neutral on the question of continued bilateral relations with the U.S. It 
is possible that the neutral answers once again came from the controversy surrounding 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 Migration Information Source. “Taiwanese Immigrants in the United States,” Migration 
Information Source, http://www.migrationinformation.org/usfocus/display.cfm?ID=790, 
(accessed April 9, 2013). 
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the issue. Controversy over AIT and the stated “cultural and commercial relations”, 
however, is slight. It is therefore most likely that the 21 percent of respondents who 
answered the question neutrally are simply those citizens who have never interacted 
with, nor plan to interact with AIT.  
As stated earlier, AIT received the second highest number of votes in the SA 
category (55 percent), which demonstrates a clear sense of agreement with the 
statement that the U.S. should continue its cultural and commercial relations through 
AIT.  
Question Six: Participation in International Organizations 
 
“I believe it is important that the United States support Taiwan in their membership in 
international organizations.” 
“我認為，美國應支持臺灣其國際組織會員資格.” 
The TRA itself is somewhat vague on the issue of support for Taiwan’s 
participation in international organizations. Rather than proclaiming actual support, it 
states, “nothing in this chapter may be construed as a basis for supporting the 
exclusion or expulsion of Taiwan from continued membership in any international 
financial institution or any other international organization.”37 The law removes only 
the possibility that the TRA itself might support Taiwan’s non-participation in 
international organizations. Question six, therefore, was re-worded significantly in 
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order to gauge Taiwanese opinion on the importance of U.S. support on this issue, as 
well as to keep the question’s form similar to the other five.   
According to the Taiwanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA)’s website, 
“The nation’s broad participation in international organizations is of substantive 
benefit to the global community and also aids the nation’s own progress in many 
areas.”38 The Taiwanese government, regardless of which party is in power, is 
consistently supportive of Taiwan’s right to participate in international organizations. 
Traditionally, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) has pushed harder and stronger 
for full participation in larger, more substantive international organizations, including 
the United Nations. The Kuomintang (KMT), on the other hand, tends to lean more 
towards appeasing the mainland, and seeks observer status in much smaller and less 
controversial international organizations like the International Civil Aviation 
Organization (ICAO). According to a Taiwanese government website:  
The nation enjoys membership in 27 intergovernmental organizations (IGO) 
and their subsidiary bodies. These include the Asian Development Bank; the 
World Trade Organization (WTO), which Taiwan joined under the name 
“Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu”; and the 
Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum, in which it participates as 
“Chinese Taipei”—a name it also uses for its national Olympics committee 
and in the WHA. The ROC also has observer status or associate membership 
in 21 other IGOs and their subsidiary bodies.39 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38 Republic of China (Taiwan) Government Entry Point, “International Organizations,” 
Taiwan Government Entry Point, 
http://www.taiwan.gov.tw/ct.asp?xItem=27190&ctNode=1922&mp=1001 (accessed April 8, 
2013). 
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 As stated earlier, there are those in the U.S. media and government who have 
come out in support of Taiwan’s increased participation in international organizations. 
In August 2011, the Council of State Governments Eastern Regional Conference 
formally expressed support for Taiwan’s request to participate in the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change and the ICAO.40 When combined with 
the support of the U.S. Senate for participation in the ICAO, the Taiwanese are likely 
to gain observer status, if not full membership in this organization. The question 
remains, however, whether observer status in organizations like the ICAO is enough. 
In the modern world, participation in international organizations is arguably quite 
important:   
Confronted by common issues and concerns transcending their borders, states 
have realized that to satisfy the demands of their constituencies, international 
coordination and cooperation are essential for meaningful solutions to these 
problems. As a result, international organizations emerged as much-needed 
forums for states to achieve functional collaboration in their pursuit of 
common interests and welfare.41 
 Taiwan, however, has been continually pushed out of these opportunities to 
collaborate on important issues because of her relationship with the PRC. “China 
insisted that under the “One China” principle, Taiwan should either be ousted from 
the organizations China sought to join or remain out of any organizations of which 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40 Council of State Governments, Eastern Regional Conference, “Resolution on Support for 
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China was already a member.”42 The Taiwanese argue that they have insight and 
experience to contribute, and that their participation would only serve to better the 
organizations that they join. They are likely justified in these statements, but this 
justification has had little effect on their membership status across the board. China’s 
growing power in the world only serves to weaken Taiwan’s position on the issue.  
 Despite Taiwan’s fragile position, it is clear from the figure below that they 
desire the U.S.’s support of their participation in international organizations. When 
we combine the A and SA categories, we discover that 83 percent of respondents are 
in favor of this support. This puts “international organizations” second only to 
“immigration rights”, which received a positive response of 88 percent. The important 
difference here is that participation in international organizations received a 
staggering 62 percent in the SA category, which is significantly higher than 
immigration rights, with only 24 percent SA.  
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Figure 8 
 
 Neutrality on this issue is also extremely low, with only 8 percent of 
respondents answering N. This is in fact the category with the lowest percent of 
neutrality among all of the categories in the survey. With a combined 9 percent of 
respondents in disagreement (5 percent SD and 4 percent D), it is evident what the 
Taiwanese people believe about U.S. support for their participation in international 
organizations. While this participation is still somewhat controversial in the 
international community, the data on this question speaks for itself. The Taiwanese 
people believe it is important that the United States support Taiwan in their 
membership in international organizations.  
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Chapter Five: Collective Analysis 
 
 Having discussed each individual question and their backgrounds, I will now 
conduct an analysis of them collectively. Several new rankings will be offered as 
alternatives to the initial ranking in Figure 2.  
Weighted Averages 
 
In the original ranking, which can be found in Figure 2, the means were 
calculated with the typical Likert Scale weights: SD = 1, D = 2, N = 3, A = 4, and SA 
= 5. In this section, in order to determine how strongly respondents feel about the 
issues overall, regardless of the direction of their opinion (agree or disagree), the 
following weights will be given to each category: SD = 2, D = 1, N = 0, A = 1, and 
SA = 2. In this way, the more strongly an individual feels about a given statement, the 
more weight their answer is given. If the response is neutral, the answer will receive 
no weight at all. When these calculations are complete, the following means are 
achieved (placed in order): 
1. Participation in International Organizations: 1.59 
2. The American Institute in Taiwan: 1.37 
3. Defense Relations: 1.26 
4. Immigration Rights: 1.17 
5. Treaties: 0.934 
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6. Legal Relations: 0.845 
Figure 9 
 
 When compared with Figure 2, the ranking above is quite different. Defense 
relations falls right in the middle, as opposed to last place in the former ranking. 
Participation in international organizations remains in the top spot, but AIT has moved 
up one spot from third to second. Significantly, immigration rights has dropped two 
spots from second to fourth. These new rankings, as stated above, demonstrate how 
strongly individuals feel about the issues in question. Participation in international 
organizations received the top spot in both Figure 2 and Figure 9’s rankings. It can 
therefore be determined that not only do the majority of Taiwanese want more U.S. 
support for their participation in international organizations, but that the Taiwanese 
people care deeply about this issue – more so, in fact, than any of the other issues at 
hand (regardless of whether they agree or disagree with the need for more U.S. 
support on the issue). 
 Legal relations moved down to the bottom spot in this new ranking, which is 
consistent with our earlier analysis that it is the least controversial of all the issues. 
Immigration rights moved down two spots to fourth place due to the lack of SA 
responses in this category. Perhaps most strikingly, defense relations moved up three 
spots, from last place to third. Once again, we must consider that despite defense’s 
original last place ranking, it is nonetheless a very important factor in the bilateral 
relationship. Taiwanese citizens, while divided on the issue, care very much about it. 
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The same is true of AIT, which moved up one spot from third to second. The top three 
issues on this list (participation in international organizations, AIT, and defense 
relations) must all be taken quite seriously by both parties, for it is apparent that the 
Taiwanese are greatly concerned with them.  
Degree of Agreement 
 
Each of the six categories in our initial survey rankings received a significant 
portion of A and SA votes. When the A and SA votes for each category are combined, 
we obtain the following percentages (in order, highest to lowest): Immigration Rights: 
88 percent, Participation in International Organizations: 83 percent, The American 
Institute in Taiwan:  69 percent, Treaties: 67 percent, Legal Relations: 57 percent, 
Defense Relations: 53 percent.  
 As stated in the analyses in Chapter Four, however, AIT has significantly more 
SA votes than immigration rights (55 percent vs. 24 percent). It is possible therefore, 
that AIT should be ranked higher on the ordinal scale than immigration rights. In order 
to compare the levels of agreement among the categories, I will complete a ratio 
calculation of “strong agreement” to “agreement.” The resultant ratios are listed in the 
table below: 
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 Strongly Agree Agree N* Ratio, SA:A 
Immigration Rights 151 394 545 0.3832487 
International 
Organizations 
386 127 513 3.0393700 
The American Institute in 
Taiwan 
341 77 418 4.4285714 
Defense Relations 141 185 326 0.7621621 
Legal Relations 115 240 355 0.4791666 
Treaties 91 322 413 0.2826086 
TOTAL 1225 1345 2570 0.9107806 
Figure 10                           *N = Total Number of SA and A Responses for 
Category 
 
The American Institute in Taiwan and participation in international 
organizations are the only two categories in the entire survey which have a value 
higher than 1. They are, likewise, the only two categories that received more SA 
responses than A responses. With a ratio of 4.4:1, AIT leans heavily towards the SA 
Ratio	  of	  “Strongly	  Agree”	  to	  “Agree”	  Answers	  Across	  Categories	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response category. Participation in international organizations has a SA:A ratio of 
around 3:1. Defense relations’s new placement is also worthy of note. It becomes the 
third highest ranked category on the list with a ratio of 0.76:1. These ratios serve to 
demonstrate how strong the level of agreement is among those that agreed with any 
given statement. This is the first ranking that we have come across in which 
“participation in international organizations” was not placed first. It seems that, among 
those who agree across all six questions, they agree most strongly with the need for 
continuing commercial and cultural relations through AIT, and least strongly with the 
requirement that the U.S. continue to honor treaties and other international 
agreements.  
We must take into account the fact that participation in international 
organizations received more overall votes of agreement than AIT (513 vs. 418). The 
ranking in Figure 10                           *N = Total Number of SA and A Responses for 
Category is therefore a simple representation of ratios. Of those who do agree with any 
of the statements in the survey, they agree more strongly with those questions with a 
higher ratio (AIT and participation in international organizations).  
Response Types 
 
The figure below, which represents the summed values of each response-type 
(A, SA, etc) across issue-areas, easily demonstrates that respondents tend to agree with 
questions more than disagree. In fact, the defense relations category is the only 
category with significant D & SD response rates.   
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Figure 11 
 One thousand six hundred and seventy seven respondents, or 38.7 percent of 
all respondents across categories chose to “agree” with the given statement, whereas 
only 7.2 percent chose to “disagree.” The data in Figure 11 shows that, when it comes 
to the Taiwanese relationship with the United States, the typical Taiwanese citizen is 
more likely to agree with the importance of any given aspect of the relationship than 
dismiss it as unimportant. It also shows, as was demonstrated above, that respondents 
are most likely to “agree” with survey questions regarding this bilateral relationship, 
and least likely to “strongly disagree.” 
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Chapter Six: Conclusion and Policy Implications 
 
 When the TRA was signed in 1979, no one could have predicted the enormous 
impact it would have on the future of both U.S.-Taiwan relations and the triangular 
relationship between the U.S., China and Taiwan. The sections of the act discussed in 
this paper have all developed in ways that have been largely positive for the U.S. and 
Taiwan. The importance of each of these regulations cannot be overstated. If the U.S. 
were to remove any of them from the TRA, the relationship with Taiwan would 
certainly suffer. That being said, certain sections are of more importance to the 
bilateral relationship than others.  
While U.S. policymakers and most other international actors consider defense 
relations to be of primary importance, it is not clear that the Taiwanese feel the same 
way. Because of the controversy surrounding the sale of arms to Taiwan, the 
Taiwanese are very split on the issue. Indeed, defense relations was the only category 
in the survey to receive a significant portion (20 percent D and 15 percent SD) of 
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disagreement. Still, 53 percent of respondents ultimately agreed with the need for 
continued defensive aid to Taiwan.  
Survey results showed that legal relations with Taiwan were far less 
controversial than defense relations. With far more neutral responses than any other 
category in the survey (35 percent), support for the standard application of laws was 
either misunderstood or simply not as important to the Taiwanese people.  
The right to standard immigration practices was among the most important of 
the categories to the Taiwanese. With 88 percent of respondents in support of such 
rights, it is clear that they are both informed and passionate about the issue. This 
highly positive response rate, however, may have been due to the prominence of U.S.-
Taiwan immigration policies in the news at the time of survey distribution.  
When it came to deciding whether or not to support the claim that the U.S. 
should continue to honor treaties and other international agreements, Taiwanese 
citizens were again, largely in favor. The treaties category, however, received the 
lowest percent of SA votes, and the second highest percent of neutral votes. As with 
the legal relations question, it is possible that the treaties question was misunderstood, 
or that there was a general lack of awareness regarding the issue.  
The AIT issue was among the most interesting in the survey. The question 
garnered by far the largest ratio of “strongly agree” to “agree” responses, which 
suggests that, those that do agree with the importance of continued commercial and 
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cultural ties through AIT, agree quite strongly. AIT, however, still received a vote of 
21 percent neutrality. Despite the generally positive image that AIT has in Taiwan, 
and the high level of interaction that Taiwanese citizens have with the organization, 
many citizens remained on the fence about its importance. This might be due to a 
misunderstood controversy, or it could be attributed to the percent of Taiwanese who 
have no interaction with AIT. Either way, with 68 percent of respondents in support of 
continued commercial and cultural relations, it is clearly an important issue to the 
majority of Taiwanese. 
Finally, we must address the issue of Taiwanese participation in international 
organizations, another controversial subject within the U.S.-China-Taiwan 
relationship. This category received the most “strongly agree” responses, and was 
consistently ranked highly in each of the different calculations completed in this paper. 
In Figure 2, the initial ranking of pure averages, participation in international 
organizations received the top spot. Again, in Figure 9, which sought to demonstrate 
how strongly respondents felt about a given category through weighted averages, this 
category was ranked number one. In fact, the only ranking in which participation in 
international organizations did not receive first place was the calculation of “strongly 
agree : agree” ratios. In this last ranking, participation in international organizations 
earned second place, next to AIT.  
From the above statements, we can determine several important things. (1) 
U.S. support for Taiwanese participation in international organizations is very 
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important to the Taiwanese people. (2) A lack of neutrality and an extremely low level 
of disagreement (3 percent) on the issue of immigration rights makes this an almost 
equally important issue. However, having already allowed Taiwan into the VWP, the 
issue has been largely solved, and therefore no longer requires as much attention. (3) 
The treaties and legal relations categories both received generally positive responses, 
but may have been misunderstood by the general public who responded to the survey. 
This was due to a probable lack of awareness of what types of laws and/or treaties 
exist between Taiwan and the U.S. (4) The American Institute in Taiwan is important 
to the Taiwanese people. It provides an avenue for not only cultural and commercial 
ties, but for high-level dialogue, and most of the other issues within the survey 
(including immigration and legal issues). Over half of the population strongly agrees 
with the need for the continuance of these ties through AIT. (5) The issue of defense 
relations is the most contested issue at hand for the Taiwanese. They generally believe 
in the need for continued defensive aid from the U.S., but many citizens are likely 
wary of stating this belief.  
So what does this all mean for U.S. policymakers, who currently place a high 
degree of importance on defense relations? In short, other issues should be given more 
importance in the bilateral relationship. Among these issues that require more 
attention is U.S. support for Taiwanese participation in international organizations. 
This support does not have to be support for full membership in the United Nations, 
nor does it require statements by the President of the United States. The Taiwanese are 
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clearly concerned with their ability to put their significant knowledge and resources to 
use in the larger world. And indeed, this is one area where it would behoove the U.S. 
and the international community to support Taiwan. The Taiwanese have decades of 
experience in dealing with disaster relief and health concerns (among other issues) that 
would be immeasurably useful to share with the world. The U.S. should therefore 
seriously consider increasing their support for membership, or at the very least, 
observer status in IGOs like the WHO.  
Immigration policies, as stated above, do not need to be changed, but should be 
kept up. Support for treaties, international agreements and legal relations with Taiwan 
should be treated in a similar manner. Despite the support for these issues among 
Taiwanese citizens, they are less understood and equally less controversial than other 
issues in the survey.  
The American Institute in Taiwan should likewise continue to promote 
cultural, commercial, and other types of cooperation between the two countries. As the 
Chairman of AIT, Raymond Burghardt put it, the relationship “is not just political and 
cultural and economic — it’s military, it’s people-to-people, it’s all kinds of 
things…There is intelligence exchange; there are mutual assessments of defense 
needs; there is training that goes on.”43 All of these tasks are done through AIT, and its 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
43 Lowther, William. “US-Taiwan Relations Remain Robust: Burghardt,” Taipei Times, July 
14, 2012, Front Page. 
http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2012/07/14/2003537694 (accessed April 17, 
2013). Myerson, Roger B. Game Theory: Analysis of Conflict, Harvard University Press, 
1997. 
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importance to the relationship cannot be overstated. The U.S. must continue to support 
AIT and to develop new and meaningful dialogue through AIT into the future. 
Finally, we come to the contentious issue of defense relations. Current U.S. 
policy on selling arms to Taiwan is unclear. In Chapter Two it was mentioned that the 
U.S. has recently been considering selling Taiwan the much-needed F16 C/D aircraft 
that they have been requesting for years. A move like this would surely incite great 
anger in China, and would stress the U.S.-China relationship and the Taiwan-China 
relationship. In the past, such moves have led to cross-Strait crises. The question here, 
however, is not whether the U.S. should increase the sale of arms to Taiwan, but 
whether policymakers should place such a high importance on these sales. The 
Taiwanese obviously care deeply about the issue, whether they agree or disagree with 
the need for continued defensive aid. Defense relations cannot, therefore, be pushed to 
the wayside. In the initial ranking of importance based on overall averages, however, 
defense relations came in last place. It is possible that the U.S. currently focuses too 
much on the defensive needs of Taiwan, and should place this focus elsewhere. If the 
U.S. can support Taiwanese observer status in the WHO (or other IGOs), and receive 
less of a negative reaction from China, is this not more worthy of our attention? If we 
take the survey results at face value, such support will be more appreciated by the 
Taiwanese than further weapons sales would be.  
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Ultimately, it will be up to the policymakers to decide where to put their 
efforts. Hopefully, in understanding better what the Taiwanese believe is of 
importance, they will be better informed, and therefore better able to make important 
and impactful decisions.
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    Figure 12
Total	  Survey	  Responses	  by	  Number	  of	  Votes	  and	  Percentages	  
“I	  believe	  that	  X	  is	  important	  to	  U.S.-­‐Taiwan	  Relations”	  
“X”	  =	  Defense,	  Legal,	  Immigration,	  etc.	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Appendix B 
 
 
United States Code TITLE 22 - FOREIGN RELATIONS AND INTERCOURSE 
CHAPTER 48 - TAIWAN RELATIONS 
Sec. 3301. Congressional findings and declaration of policy   
(a) Findings 
The President having terminated governmental relations between the United States 
and the governing authorities on Taiwan recognized by the United States as the 
Republic of China prior to January 1, 1979, the Congress finds that the enactment of 
this chapter is necessary - 
  §  (1) to help maintain peace, security, and stability in the Western Pacific; and  
  §  (2) to promote the foreign policy of the United States by authorizing the 
continuation of commercial, cultural, and other relations between the people of 
the United States and the people on Taiwan.  
(b) Policy It is the policy of the United States - 
  §  (1) to preserve and promote extensive, close, and friendly commercial, 
cultural, and other relations between the people of the United States and the 
people on Taiwan, as well as the people on the China mainland and all other 
peoples of the Western Pacific area;  
  §  (2) to declare that peace and stability in the area are in the political, security, 
and economic interests of the United States, and are matters of international 
concern;  
  §  (3) to make clear that the United States decision to establish diplomatic 
relations with the People's Republic of China rests upon the expectation that 
the future of Taiwan will be determined by peaceful means;  
  §  (4) to consider any effort to determine the future of Taiwan by other than 
peaceful means, including by boycotts or embargoes, a threat to the peace and 
security of the Western Pacific area and of grave concern to the United States;  
  §  (5) to provide Taiwan with arms of a defensive character; and  
The Taiwan Relations Act (In Full) 
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  §  (6) to maintain the capacity of the United States to resist any resort to force 
 or other forms of coercion that would jeopardize the security, or the social  or 
economic system, of the people on Taiwan.  
(c) Human rights 
Nothing contained in this chapter shall contravene the interest of the United States in 
human rights, especially with respect to the human rights of all the approximately 
eighteen million inhabitants of Taiwan. The preservation and enhancement of the 
human rights of all the people on Taiwan are hereby reaffirmed as objectives of the 
United States. 
Sec. 3302. Implementation of United States policy with regard to Taiwan   
(a) Defense articles and services 
In furtherance of the policy set forth in section 3301 of this title, the United States will 
make available to Taiwan such defense articles and defense services in such quantity 
as may be necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability. 
(b) Determination of Taiwan's defense needs The President and the Congress shall 
determine the nature and quantity of such defense articles and services based solely 
upon their judgment of the needs of Taiwan, in accordance with procedures 
established by law. Such determination of Taiwan's defense needs shall include review 
by United States military authorities in connection with recommendations to the 
President and the Congress. 
(c) United States response to threats to Taiwan or dangers to United States interests 
The President is directed to inform the Congress promptly of any threat to the security 
or the social or economic system of the people on Taiwan and any danger to the 
interests of the United States arising therefrom. The President and the Congress shall 
determine, in accordance with constitutional processes, appropriate action by the 
United States in response to any such danger. 
 
Sec. 3303. Application to Taiwan of laws and international agreements  
(a) Application of United States laws generally 
The absence of diplomatic relations or recognition shall not affect the application of 
the laws of the United States with respect to Taiwan, and the laws of the United States 
shall apply with respect to Taiwan in the manner that the laws of the United States 
applied with respect to Taiwan prior to January 1, 1979. 
  64 
(b) Application of United States laws in specific and enumerated areas The application 
of subsection (a) of this section shall include, but shall not be limited to, the following: 
  §  (1) Whenever the laws of the United States refer or relate to foreign 
countries, nations, states, governments, or similar entities, such terms shall 
include and such laws shall apply with respect to Taiwan.  
  §  (2) Whenever authorized by or pursuant to the laws of the United States to 
conduct or carry out programs, transactions, or other relations with respect to 
foreign countries, nations, states, governments, or similar entities, the President 
or any agency of the United States Government is authorized to conduct and 
carry out, in accordance with section 3305 of this title, such programs, 
transactions, and other relations with respect to Taiwan (including, but not 
limited to, the performance of services for the United States through contracts 
with commercial entities on Taiwan), in accordance with the applicable laws of 
 the United States.  
  §  (3)  § (A) The absence of diplomatic relations and recognition with respect 
to Taiwan shall not abrogate, infringe, modify, deny, or otherwise affect in any 
way any rights or obligations (including but not limited to those involving 
contracts, debts, or property interests of any kind) under the laws of the United 
States heretofore or hereafter acquired by or with respect to Taiwan.  § (B) For 
all purposes under the laws of the United States, including actions in any court 
in the United States, recognition of the People's Republic of China shall not 
affect in any way the ownership of or other rights or interests in properties, 
tangible and intangible, and other things of value, owned or held on or prior to 
December 31, 1978, or thereafter acquired or earned by the governing 
authorities on Taiwan.  
  §  (4) Whenever the application of the laws of the United States depends upon 
the law that is or was applicable on Taiwan or compliance therewith, the law 
applied by the people on Taiwan shall be considered the applicable law for that 
purpose.  
  §  (5) Nothing in this chapter, nor the facts of the President's action in 
extending diplomatic recognition to the People's Republic of China, the 
absence of diplomatic relations between the people on Taiwan and the United 
States, or the lack of recognition by the United States, and attendant 
circumstances thereto, shall be construed in any administrative or judicial 
proceeding as a basis for any United States Government agency, commission, 
or department to make a finding of fact or determination of law, under the 
Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2011 et seq.) and the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Act of 1978 (22 U.S.C. 3201 et seq.), to deny an export license 
application or to revoke an existing export license for nuclear exports to 
  65 
Taiwan.  
  §  (6) For purposes of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101 et 
seq.), Taiwan may be treated in the manner specified in the first sentence of 
section 202(b) of that Act (8 U.S.C. 1152(b)).  
  §  (7) The capacity of Taiwan to sue and be sued in courts in the United States, 
in accordance with the laws of the United States, shall not be abrogated, 
infringed, modified, denied, or otherwise affected in any way by the absence of 
diplomatic relations or recognition.  
§ (8) No requirement, whether expressed or implied, under the laws of the 
United States with respect to maintenance of diplomatic relations or 
recognition shall be applicable with respect to Taiwan. 
(c) Treaties and other international agreements For all purposes, including actions in 
any court in the United States, the Congress approves the continuation in force of all 
treaties and other international agreements, including multilateral conventions, entered 
into by the United States and the governing authorities on Taiwan recognized by the 
United States as the Republic of China prior to January 1, 1979, and in force between 
them on December 31, 1978, unless and until terminated in accordance with law. 
(d) Membership in international financial institutions and other international 
organizations 
Nothing in this chapter may be construed as a basis for supporting the exclusion or 
expulsion of Taiwan from continued membership in any international financial 
institution or any other international organization. 
Sec. 3304. Overseas Private Investment Corporation  
(a) Removal of per capita income restriction on Corporation activities with respect 
toinvestment projects on Taiwan During the three-year period beginning on April 10, 
1979, the $1,000 per capita income restriction in clause (2) of the second undesignated 
paragraph of section 2191 of this title shall not restrict the activities of the Overseas 
Private Investment Corporation in determining whether to provide any insurance, 
reinsurance, loans, or guaranties with respect to investment projects on Taiwan. 
(b) Application by Corporation of other criteria Except as provided in subsection (a) of 
this section, in issuing insurance, reinsurance, loans, or guaranties with respect to 
investment projects on Taiwan, the Overseas Private Insurance [1] Corporation shall 
apply the same criteria as those applicable in other parts of the world. 
 [1] Note: So in original. Probably should be ''Investment''. 
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Sec. 3305. The American Institute in Taiwan  
(a) Conduct of programs, transactions, or other relations with respect to Taiwan 
Programs, transactions, and other relations conducted or carried out by the President 
or any agency of the United States Government with respect to Taiwan shall, in the 
manner and to the extent directed by the President, be conducted and carried out by or 
through - 
§ (1) The American Institute in Taiwan, a nonprofit corporation incorporated 
under the laws of the District of Columbia, or 
§ (2) such comparable successor nongovernmental entity as the President may 
designate, (hereafter in this chapter referred to as the ''Institute''). 
(b) Agreements or transactions relative to Taiwan entered into, performed, and 
enforced 
Whenever the President or any agency of the United States Government is authorized 
or required by or pursuant to the laws of the United States to enter into, perform, 
enforce, or have in force an agreement or transaction relative to Taiwan, such 
agreement or transaction shall be entered into, performed, and enforced, in the manner 
and to the extent directed by the President, by or through the Institute. 
(c) Preemption of laws, rules, regulations, or ordinances of District of Columbia, 
States, or political subdivisions of States To the extent that any law, rule, regulation, 
or ordinance of the District of Columbia, or of any State or political subdivision 
thereof in which the Institute is incorporated or doing business, impedes or otherwise 
interferes with the performance of the functions of the Institute pursuant to this 
chapter, such law, rule, regulation, or ordinance shall be deemed to be preempted by 
this chapter. 
Sec. 3306. Services to United States citizens on Taiwan  
(a) Authorized services 
The Institute may authorize any of its employees on Taiwan - 
  §  (1) to administer to or take from any person an oath, affirmation, affidavit, 
or deposition, and to perform any notarial act which any notary public is 
required or authorized by law to perform within the United States;  
  §  (2) To [1] act as provisional conservator of the personal estates of deceased 
United States citizens; and  
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 [1] Note: So in original. Probably should not be capitalized.  
  §  (3) to assist and protect the interests of United States persons by performing 
other acts such as are authorized to be performed outside the United States for 
consular purposes by such laws of the United States as the President may 
specify.  
(b) Acts by authorized employees Acts performed by authorized employees of the 
Institute under this section shall be valid, and of like force and effect within the United 
States, as if performed by any other person authorized under the laws of the United 
States to perform such acts. 
Sec. 3307. Exemption from taxation   
(a) United States, State, or local taxes 
The Institute, its property, and its income are exempt from all taxation now or 
hereafter imposed by the United States (except to the extent that section 3310(a)(3) of 
this title requires the imposition of taxes imposed under chapter 21of title 26, relating 
to the Federal Insurance Contributions Act) or by any State or local taxing authority of 
the United States. 
(b) Charitable contributions; transfers for public, charitable, and religious uses; 
charitable and similar gifts For purposes of title 26, the Institute shall be treated as an 
organization described in sections 170(b)(1)(A), 170(c),2055 (a), 2106(a)(2)(A), 
2522(a), and 2522(b) of title 26. 
Sec. 3308. Activities of United States Government agencies  
(a) Sale, loans, or lease of property; administrative and technical support functions and 
services Any agency of the United States Government is authorized to sell, loan, or 
lease property (including interests therein) to, and to perform administrative and 
technical support functions and services for the operations of, the Institute upon such 
terms and conditions as the President may direct. Reimbursements to agencies under 
this subsection shall be credited to the current applicable appropriation of the agency 
concerned. 
(b) Acquisition and acceptance of services Any agency of the United States 
Government is authorized to acquire and accept services from the Institute upon such 
terms and conditions as the President may direct. Whenever the President determines 
it to be in furtherance of the purposes of this chapter, the procurement of services by 
such agencies from the Institute may be effected without regard to such laws of the 
United States normally applicable to the acquisition of services by such agencies as 
the President may specify by Executive order. 
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(c) Institute books and records; access; audit Any agency of the United States 
Government making funds available to the Institute in accordance with this chapter 
shall make arrangements with the Institute for the Comptroller General of the United 
States to have access to the books and records of the Institute and the opportunity to 
audit the operations of the Institute. 
 
Sec. 3309. Taiwan instrumentality  
(a) Establishment of instrumentality; Presidential determination of necessary 
authority Whenever the President or any agency of the United States Government is 
authorized or required by or pursuant to the laws of the United States to render or 
provide to or to receive or accept from Taiwan, any performance, communication, 
assurance, undertaking, or other action, such action shall, in the manner and to the 
extent directed by the President, be rendered or provided to, or received or accepted 
from an instrumentality established by Taiwan which the President determines has the 
necessary authority under the laws applied by the people on Taiwan to provide 
assurances and take other actions on behalf of Taiwan in accordance with this chapter. 
(b) Offices and personnel The President is requested to extend to the instrumentality 
established by Taiwan the same number of offices and complement of personnel as 
were previously operated in the United States by the governing authorities on Taiwan 
recognized as the Republic of China prior to January 1, 1979. 
(c) Privileges and immunities Upon the granting by Taiwan of comparable privileges 
and immunities with respect to the Institute and its appropriate personnel, the 
President is authorized to extend with respect to the Taiwan instrumentality and its 
appropriate personnel, such privileges and immunities (subject to appropriate 
conditions and obligations) as may be necessary for the effective performance of their 
functions. 
Sec. 3310. Employment of United States Government agency personnel  
(a) Separation from Government service; reemployment or reinstatement upon 
termination of Institute employment; benefits 
  §  (1) Under such terms and conditions as the President may direct, any agency 
 of the United States Government may separate from Government service for a 
specified period any officer or employee of that agency who accepts 
employment with the Institute.  
  §  (2) An officer or employee separated by an agency under paragraph (1) of 
this subsection for employment with the Institute shall be entitled upon 
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termination of such employment to reemployment or reinstatement with such 
agency (or a successor agency) in an appropriate position with the attendant 
rights, privileges, and benefits with [1] the officer or employee would have had 
or acquired had he or she not been so separated, subject to such time period 
and other conditions as the President may prescribe.  
   [1] Note: So in original. Probably should be ''which''.  
  §  (3) An officer or employee entitled to reemployment or reinstatement rights 
 under paragraph (2) of this subsection shall, while continuously employed by 
the Institute with no break in continuity of service, continue to participate in 
any benefit program in which such officer or employee was participating prior 
to employment by the Institute, including programs for compensation for job-
related death, injury, or illness; programs for health and life insurance; 
programs for annual, sick, and other statutory leave; and programs for 
retirement under any system established by the laws of the United States; 
except that employment with the Institute shall be the basis for participation in 
such programs only to the extent that employee deductions and employer 
contributions, as required, in payment for such participation for the period of 
employment with the Institute, are currently deposited in the program's or 
system's fund or depository. Death or retirement of any such officer or 
employee during approved service with the Institute and prior to reemployment 
or reinstatement shall be considered a death in or retirement from Government 
service for purposes of any employee or survivor benefits acquired by reason 
of service with an agency of the United States Government.  
  §  (4) Any officer or employee of an agency of the United States Government 
who entered into service with the Institute on approved leave of absence 
without pay prior to April 10, 1979, shall receive the benefits of this section for 
the period of such service.  
(b) Employment of aliens on Taiwan Any agency of the United States Government 
employing alien personnel on Taiwan may transfer such personnel, with accrued 
allowances, benefits, and rights, to the Institute without a break in service for purposes 
of retirement and other benefits, including continued participation in any system 
established by the laws of the United States for the retirement of employees in which 
the alien was participating prior to the transfer to the Institute, except that employment 
with the Institute shall be creditable for retirement purposes only to the extent that 
employee deductions and employer contributions, as required, in payment for such 
participation for the period of employment with the Institute, are currently deposited in 
the system's fund or depository. 
(c) Institute employees not deemed United States employees Employees of the 
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Institute shall not be employees of the United States and, in representing the Institute, 
shall be exempt from section of title 18. 
(d) Tax treatment of amounts paid Institute employees 
  §  (1) For purposes of sections and 913 of title 26, amounts paid by the 
 Institute to its employees shall not be treated as earned income. Amounts 
received by employees of the Institute shall not be included in gross income, 
and shall be exempt from taxation, to the extent that they are equivalent to 
amounts received by civilian officers and employees of the Government of the 
United States as allowances and benefits which are exempt from taxation under 
section 912 of title 26.  
  §  (2) Except to the extent required by subsection (a)(3) of this section, service 
performed in the employ of the Institute shall not constitute employment for 
purposes of chapter 21 of title 26 and title II of the Social Security Act (42 
U.S.C. 401 et seq.).  
Sec. 3310a. Commercial personnel at American Institute of Taiwan The American 
Institute of Taiwan shall employ personnel to perform duties similar to those 
performed by personnel of the United States and Foreign Commercial Service. The 
number of individuals employed shall be commensurate with the number of United 
States personnel of the Commercial Service who are permanently assigned to the 
United States diplomatic mission to South Korea.  
Sec. 3311. Reporting requirements  
(a) Texts of agreements to be transmitted to Congress; secret agreements to be 
transmitted to Senate Foreign Relations Committee and House Foreign Affairs 
Committee The Secretary of State shall transmit to the Congress the text of any 
agreement to which the Institute is a party. However, any such agreement the 
immediate public disclosure of which would, in the opinion of the President, be 
prejudicial to the national security of the United States shall not be so transmitted to 
the Congress but shall be transmitted to the Committee on Foreign Relations of the 
Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives under 
an appropriate injunction of secrecy to be removed only upon due notice from the 
President. 
(b) Agreements For purposes of subsection (a) of this section, the term ''agreement'' 
includes - 
§ (1) any agreement entered into between the Institute and the governing 
authorities on Taiwan or the instrumentality established by Taiwan; and 
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§ (2) any agreement entered into between the Institute and an agency of the 
United States Government. 
(c) Congressional notification, review, and approval requirements and procedures 
Agreements and transactions made or to be made by or through the Institute shall be 
subject to the same congressional notification, review, and approval requirements and 
procedures as if such agreements and transactions were made by or through the agency 
of the United States Government on behalf of which the Institute is acting. 
Sec. 3312. Rules and regulations The President is authorized to prescribe such rules 
and regulations as he may deem appropriate to carry out the purposes of this chapter. 
During the three-year period beginning on January 1, 1979, such rules and regulations 
shall be transmitted promptly to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and to 
the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate. Such action shall not, however, 
relieve the Institute of the responsibilities placed upon it by this chapter.  
Sec. 3313. Congressional oversight  
(a) Monitoring activities of Senate Foreign Relations Committee, House Foreign 
Affairs Committee, and other Congressional committees The Committee on Foreign 
Affairs of the House of Representatives, the Committee on Foreign Relations of the 
Senate, and other appropriate committees of the Congress shall monitor - 
  §  (1) the implementation of the provisions of this chapter;  
  §  (2) the operation and procedures of the Institute;  
  §  (3) the legal and technical aspects of the continuing relationship between the 
 United States and Taiwan; and  
  §  (4) the implementation of the policies of the United States concerning 
 security and cooperation in East Asia.  
(b) Committee reports to their respective Houses 
Such committees shall report, as appropriate, to their respective Houses on the results 
of their monitoring 
Sec. 3314. Definitions For purposes of this chapter - 
(1) the term ''laws of the United States'' includes any statute, rule, regulation, 
ordinance, order, or judicial rule of decision of the United States or any political 
subdivision thereof; and 
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(2) the term ''Taiwan'' includes, as the context may require, the islands of Taiwan and 
the Pescadores, the people on those islands, corporations and other entities and 
associations created or organized under the laws applied on those islands, and the 
governing authorities on Taiwan recognized by the United States as the Republic of 
China prior to January 1, 1979, and any successor governing authorities (including 
political subdivisions, agencies, and instrumentalities thereof). 
Sec. 3315. Authorization of appropriations In addition to funds otherwise available 
to carry out the provisions of this chapter, there are authorized to be appropriated to 
the Secretary of State for the fiscal year 1980 such funds as may be necessary to carry 
out such provisions. Such funds are authorized to remain available until expended.  
Sec. 3316. Severability If any provision of this chapter or the application thereof to 
any person or circumstance is held invalid, the remainder of the chapter and the 
application of such provision to any other person or circumstance shall not be affected 
thereby.  
 
 
